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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 08/07/2011

Accident number: 726

Accident time: 08:10

Accident Date: 20/11/2010

Where it occurred: CDS, Deh Sabz
District, Kabul
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Victim inattention (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Demolition accident

Date of main report: None

ID original source: None

Name of source: Restricted

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: various, HE charge

Ground condition: demolition site
(explosives)
Date last modified: 08/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)

Accident report
Because this accident involved the death of an expatriate it was covered widely in the press.
A formal UNMACCA report of the accident was made available (by roundabout means) in
early 2011. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being
lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more information
becomes available.
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
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BOARD OF INQUIRY ABOUT FATAL DEMINING ACCIDENT of [the Victim] a member of
[Demining group]
INTRODUCTION
Mr. [Name removed], MACCA Chief of Staff convened a Board of Inquiry (BOI) team to
investigate the circumstances involved in the demining accident causing the death of [the
Victim] Technical Advisor of [Demining group].
The BOI comprised the following personnel:
Dr. [Name removed] Chief of QM MACCA Chairman
[Name removed] Member
[Name removed] Member
[Name removed] Observer
A copy of the appointment of personnel to carry out the formal investigation including the BOI
Terms of Reference is at Annex A to this report. [Not made available.]
GEOGRAPHY AND WEATHER
The accident occurred in [Demining group] CDS [Central Demolition Site] in Deh Sabz district
of Kabul province which locates in North-East side of Kabul city, it is relatively cold in winter
season. The CDS is surrounded by a series of hills and mountains from West, South and
Northern sides. Kabul Bagram road is passed through the East side around 800 meters away
from CDS. There are 2 antenna installments of AWCC and MTN around 1000 meters to the
north side of the CDS.
Priority of Task
The task was of high priority, because the village by village EOD teams of [Demining group]
collected munitions/ERW from the villages and were ready for demolition. Therefore, the
demolition was planned in said CDS.
SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING
Although the CDS was well prepared, the distance between firing point and demolition pits
and the locations of sentries were also maintained properly. But the firing point was small and
lack of enough space for required personnel to easily locate there during the demolition
operations. The firing point was also lack of sight window to the demolition pits. Presence of 2
antennas of AWCC and MTN telecommunication system in 1km vicinity to the CDS and also
presence of Kabul Bagram road in 800 meters distance where military convoys have been
passing frequently can create Electro Magnetic Radiation and affect Electrical initiation
demolition.
MANAGEMENT, SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE ON SITE
The deceased Technical Advisor [the Victim] himself was in charge of the task. Good
management, supervision and discipline was in place in the task site.
QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL
The EOD teams of [Demining group]have been visited regularly by MACCA external QA, but
the CDS has not been visited in 2010. WRA is also conducting external QA visits on
[Demining parent group] EOD teams and the CDS as well.
COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTING
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The communication between CDS and [Demining group] office was maintained on daily basis.
And all [Demining group] operations staff in the fields are submitting their reports to their
office regularly. The accident report was also communicated immediately from the CDS to the
office.
MEDICAL REPORTS
The victim TA expired immediately after accident occurred. But medical support was available
in the site.
WITNESS INTERVIEWS AND STATEMENTS
The BOI team met with was able to conduct interview with [Name removed] the
representative of [Demining group] to the BOI team. The statement is attached to this report
as Annex C.
DETAILS OF THE MINE/ERW INVOLVED
ERW (smoke grenades) items were collected by EOD village by village teams and then were
arranged for demolition in CDS in accordance with [Demining group] SOPs.
EVIDENCE OF RE-MINING
As the accident happened in CDS, no mine or re-mining were involved in this accident.
EVIDENCE OF SITE INTERFERENCE OR TAMPERING AFTER THE ACCIDENT
Nil
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
The deceased TA worn his protective jacket and a Helmet, but as it was a heavy demolition,
so the PPE could not protect him.
USE OF MINE DETECTION DOGS (MDD)
Not required.
USE OF Mechanical MACHINES (MDU)
Not required.
DATE OF LAST REVISION COURSE FOR TEAM INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT
Deceased Technical Advisor was trained by the British Royal Air Force, and had over nine
years experience in EOD; worked all over the world and had been in Afghanistan nearly two
years. No refresher training was required to him.
DETAILS OF MEDICAL EVACUATION AND TREATMENT
[The Victim] was killed in the spot.
PARTICULARS OF DEMINERS INSURANCE
To be filled by [Demining group]
DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE ACTIVITIES ON THE DAY OF THE ACCIDENT
The demolition team of [Demining group] arranged the smoke grenades in demolition pit in
their CDS on 07:00 and then started Ordnance Disposal Operation, disposing of smoke
grenades using electric demolition procedures. On 07:33 they conducted first fire by the
exploder machine from their firing point. They waited for almost 18 minutes and then
Technical Advisor started conducting Electric Misfire Procedures, he made manual approach
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to correct misfire. On 08:10 the accident occurred and TA was killed immediately after
accident.
TECHNICAL POINTS CONTRIBUTED TO ACCIDENT
Accident occurred due to Electro Magnetic Radiation and Time on Target; Technical Advisor
had cell phone in close proximity and most likely using a satellite phone in very close
proximity to electric demolition set up; Technical Advisor spent nearly 19 minutes correcting
misfire.
SUMMARY
It is the view of the BOI team that the accident occurred due to Electro Magnetic Radiation
(EMR) and Time on Target; Technical Advisor had Cell Phone in close proximity and most
likely using a Satellite Phone in very close proximity to electric demolition set up.
CONCLUSION
It is the BOI conclusion that the Technical Advisor, [the Victim] made the mistake in terms of
having electric devices while working on a misfire case in a very close proximity to the
demolition pit.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT REOCCURRENCE
The BOI recommend the following points to be considered by [Demining group] in their future
demolition operations:
•

The location of CDS requires to be reviewed by [Demining group] in order to make
sure that the Electrical demolitions are not disturbed by any EMR.

•

Extreme care should be taken by CDS supervisors and those who conduct misfire
checks to avoid keeping and using electronic devices such as mobile phones and
hand held radios during this drill.

•

The firing point should be prepared in a way to position required personnel during the
demolition and have a well protected sight window to the demolition pit.

Signed Dr. [Name removed], BOI Chairman

ANNEXES: [ Not made available]
Annex A BOI - Terms of Reference
Annex B Site Map
Annex C Witness Interviews and Statements
Annex D Internal investigation report
A Lessons Learned document reads: “LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining
group] FATAL DEMINING ACCIDENT. This lessons learned was filed due to some legal
issues in DI’s legal department.”
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Victim Report
Victim number: 916

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 34

Gender: Male

Status: supervisory

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: Frag jacket; Helmet

Helmet

Summary of injuries:
FATAL
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. The Victim "expired immediately after
accident occurred".

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as Victim Inattention because the investigators
concluded that the Victim made an error by using an electronic device that caused a
detonation while he was close by. However, from the limited details made available in the
report, the proximity of other possible sources of electronic interference mean that the
detonation could have had another cause. The selection of a demolition site in a place where
there was a poor overview and where electronic disturbance might cause problems was a
management responsibility, so the secondary cause is listed as a Management Control
Inadequacy.
The Victim waiting 18 minutes after the misfire before “starting electronic misfire procedures”.
After a further 19 minutes the detonation occurred. This is a longer “soak time” than most
consider necessary after an electrical misfire. The number of smoke grenades involved was
not recorded and it is presumed that the number was irrelevant and that it was the demolition
charge itself that caused the fatal injuries. The Victim may have been handling the charge at
the time.
This report was made available by an unusual route and the report was stamped “This BoI
should not be released”. The suppression of the report is another example of the UN
supported MACCA failing to make accident reports available and so ignoring the
requirements of the IMAS. Afghan national staff have often been more responsible than the
internationals with overall responsibility. In this case, the BoI report lacks detail and does not
offer any compelling explanation of the events surrounding the accident. The statement that
the Victim was “most likely using a satellite phone in very close proximity to electric demolition
set up” requires some evidence to back it up. If the Satellite phone was in use, the timed
billing regime could have confirmed that, making it more than “most likely”. If there is no
evidence that he was using the phone, it was not “most likely”, merely a possibility.
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